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all political authority, including constitutional institutions. Skepti-
cal about governmental and economic hierarchies, permissive about 
traditional morality, the mixture caters to the hollow idealist and 
the crowd. It promotes an idealistic universalism that barely covers 
a weak political nihilism ("peace," "respect for all lifestyles," "non-
judgmental"), and that encourages the perennial democratic aver-
sions to authority, foresight, civic virtue, and self-restraint. Gov-
erning becomes harder and guilt-ridden; indulgence and vice, easier 
and loud. Big subsidies, big deficits, a weakened presidency, bluff 
and weakness abroad, the power of public opinion and the media, 
democratization of elections and of the Congress, vulgar public 
taste, the erosion of families and real community-follow or are 
aided. This is the crisis of American constitutionalism. 
Scholars can help by defense, by attack, and, in both, by wise 
constitutional exposition. They can defend the old constitutional-
ism by accounts of particular institutions and of the general work-
ing of our constitutional republic. In such a spirit historical studies 
are indispensable-for we need to recover what is disdained or for-
gotten. More obviously useful are applications of constitutional 
principles to practical problems-such as the extent of Congress's 
rightful controls over executive war making, or over legislative re-
districting. Judges and lawyers do it every day; the problem is to 
encourage them, as Walter Berns has done, to take seriously consti-
tutionalism, rather than an ignoble and impolitic egalitarianism. 
Last, but not least, one must reveal the foolishness of the enemy. 
One must show the difference between preoccupation with the sta-
tus of the so- called disadvantaged, and the real health of individual 
rights, of equality of opportunity, of school, city, and church, of the 
economy, and of, in general, a constitutional republic or democracy. 
NORMAN ROSENBERGI4 
When considering "What Next?" in constitutional history, a 
1987 New Republic piece, decrying scholarship-overload and pro-
posing a partial moratorium on publication of "new" works, came 
to mind. The journal's editors, foregoing Crit-bashing for a mo-
ment, singled out sociology as the most egregious example of hyper-
publication, but many of us living in the aftermath of the Bicenten-
nial may have briefly thought that constitutional history could pro-
vide an appropriate area in which to test the feasibility of a limited 
Anti-Publication Control Treaty or ABCT. (The more descriptive 
14. Professor of History, Macalester College. 
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term, Scholarly Defense Initiative, had to be rejected because some-
one has already spoken for its acronym.) 
My Modest Proposal: 
"Everyone involved in writing, evaluating, editing, and publish-
ing works of history accepts a moratorium, to be overridden only in 
cases of a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the 
constitutional-history community, against anything that talks about 
'THE CONSTITUTION' of the United States. (Hereinafter to be 
cited, albeit irregularly, as IT.)" 
Policy Arguments: 
The proposal seems, at first glance, to raise free-speech issues. 
But under currently-favored first amendment "balancing" tests, 
lawyers can surely find policy arguments for this type of pact. At 
the very least, for example, a limited ABCT in constitutional his-
tory might allow those who use words as weapons to reassess the 
strength of the article- and book-length stockpiles of their adversar-
ies before replenishing their own arsenals. (An ABCT, of course, 
would be nothing like a test-ban treaty; everyone would retain the 
right to bombard friends, colleagues, adversaries, and significant 
others with memos, manuscripts, and floppy disks.) And, as sug-
gested below, an ABCT might be justified as a positive break-
through in the battle for better constitutional histories. 
An ABCT might even draw the support of various scholarly 
combatants from the law school community. Those attracted to 
CLS-type critiques might see it as another attack upon what 
Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel called "poddism"; surely, THE 
CONSTITUTION must rank as just about the biggest pod of them 
all. Such a proposal also speaks to the concern, expressed in a wide 
variety of scholarship, about the failure of conventional approaches 
to acknowledge the historical and cultural contingency of constitu-
tional phenomena. Moreover, an ABCT seems in line with Owen 
Fiss's recent (Arthur) Schlesingerian call for liberal-"activist" 
measures that look to the "quality" rather than simply the quantity 
of the stuff circulating within the marketplace of ideas. Meanwhile, 
law-and-economics people can objectively wrestle with ABCT's 
cost-benefit implications. 
An ABCT would not merely be a negative step. The idea for 
such a pact draws inspiration, at least in part, from Steven Shrif-
frin's suggestion that genuine scholarly progress might be achieved 
if people talked less about "THE FIRST AMENDMENT" and 
"FREEDOM OF SPEECH" and more about the actual conditions 
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of "speech." An ABCT, by analogy, could serve as a constant 
warning against the temptation to frame non-contextual and/or 
ahistorical discussions dominated by the brooding omnipresence of 
IT. 
Suggestions For Implementation: 
What, then, purged of ITism, might constitutional history 
cover? Here are three simple interpretive suggestions, impressive 
models of which are readily at hand in our own libraries and 
bookshelves. 
(1) First, instead of talking about THE CONSTITUTION, 
writers might more meaningfully discuss the different "Constitu-
tions," including the one drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1789, which 
have been part of American social and political life over the years. 
As Arthur Selwyn Miller and Theodore Lowi have been sug-
gesting for years, the United States has been arguably blessed (or 
cursed) with several different constitutions. (Any list of "U.S. con-
stitutions" includes the Articles of Confederation-whatever hap-
pened to its Bicentennial?-as well as scholarly "documents" such 
as Miller's "Constitution of Control" and Lowi's "Constitution of 
the Second American Republic.") A stricture against works on 
THE CONSTITUTION might also be interpreted to extend to 
books, articles and (especially) lectures dealing with "The Develop-
ment of IT" or "The Evolution of IT." (Similarly, this might be 
interpreted to include anything purporting to explain the "develop-
ment" or "original understanding" of all words and phrases con-
tained in IT.) In addition, this proposal would create at least a 
prima facie presumption against "generic" products such as 
" and IT." 
At the same time, the clear-and-present danger proviso of 
ABCT might actually encourage publication of truly innovative 
constitutional histories, such as ones that might, following Robert 
Cover's suggestions, treat IT in terms of those symbolic and mythic 
cultural structures that deserve the fullest and most imaginative in-
terpretations possible. 
(2) In this sense, an ABCT might also help to provoke talk 
not simply about the cultural dimensions surrounding IT but about 
the more general, highly diverse "myths" of "constitutionalism." 
Viewed by Sanford Levinson as a civil religion and suggestively 
(though incompletely) defined by Walton Hamilton as "the name 
given to the trust which men repose in the power of words en-
grossed on parchment to keep a government in order," the ideal of 
constitutionalism almost inevitably demands close attention to his-
46 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:17 
torically- and culturally-grounded consciousness. Especially when 
linked to a broad vision of "constitutional pluralism," which could 
draw upon such diverse sources as the work of Cover and his disci-
ples, some strands in CLS work, the law and literature scholarship, 
and feminist legal criticism, a sharp interpretive turn away from IT 
holds considerable promise. Free from the grasp of IT, writers 
could delve into all of those very human stories about power and 
knowledge, about the reach of social institutions and groups, and 
about the popular needs and aspirations that actually bring into 
play-as works such as John Noonan's Faces & Masks of the Law 
remind us-the specialized rhetoric of constitutional lawyers and 
judges. 
(3) Discussions about "constitutional rhetoric" can be broad-
ened. Why should constitutional historians leave analysis of writers 
such as Herman Melville and the works of mass culture to those in 
the law schools and English departments? There is a wide range of 
supposedly "non- constitutional" sources that can be cross-ex-
amined in light of what can be drawn from historical studies. Here, 
quite obviously, constitutional historians need to go beyond the ob-
vious turn toward "political" histories, long prominent in works 
about IT, and connect the innovative work in cultural and social 
history that has been published in recent years to a broader, more 
pluralistic vision of constitutionalism. 
Of course, the twin moves toward an ABCT and a broader 
view of constitutional history would likely result in the work of his-
torians becoming more marginal than ever to constitutional law tra-
ditionalists, but-given the realities of the current relationship 
between law and history-do constitutional historians really have 
all that much influence to lose? 
The Obligatory Quote From "History": 
"Let us not negotiate from fear; but let us not fear to 
negotiate." 
ROBERT NAGELIS 
I am hesitant to make recommendations about directions for 
constitutional law scholarship. In the unlikely event that such sug-
gestions were taken seriously, they might constrict the range of ap-
proaches attempted in our field. One thing we do not need is more 
faddishness. Even if not taken seriously, they might convey an erro-
neous impression that I think my own work is exempt from 
15. Professor of Law, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
